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PROTECTING FASHION DESIGNS: NOT
ONLY “WHAT?” BUT “WHO?”
JULIE ZERBO*
“Design piracy can wipe out young careers in a single season. The
most severe damage from lack of protection falls upon emerging
designers, who every day lose orders, and potentially their businesses,
because copyists exploit the loophole in American law.”1
– Lazaro Hernandez, Fashion Designer & Co–Founder, Proenza

Schouler
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1. Innovative Design Protection & Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 2511
Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition and the Internet of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Hernandez Statement] (statement of
Lazaro Hernandez, Fashion Designer & Co–Founder, Proenza Schouler).
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INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is on design piracy, the rampant copying of
fashion designs by “fast fashion” retailers –– those in the business of
rapidly manufacturing and selling inexpensive copies of others’ original
designs –– and the most fitting form of protection to shield against such
piracy.2 Due to the structure of intellectual property laws in the United
States (copyright law, in particular), such copying often falls within the
parameters of legal activity, allowing retailers to engage in the manufacture
and sale of fast fashion without consequence.3
While both patent and trademark laws provide noteworthy protections
for fashion designs, as discussed below, both doctrines contain significant
procedural and substantive complications with respect to protecting
garments and accessories against blatant fast fashion copying.4 As a result,
scholars and lawmakers, alike, have turned to copyright law in their quest
to defend fashion designs from piracy. Copyright law, however, is
similarly not without its own insufficiencies.5 Historically, fashion designs
have fallen outside of the scope of copyright protection because –– as
garments and accessories –– they have an “intrinsic utilitarian function,”6
and copyright law does not protect such useful articles. The underlying
policy that drives copyright law in the United States is the encouragement
creativity so that the public can benefit. Thus, the doctrine aims to strike a
balance between (1) awarding “authors”7 enough rights to incentivize them
to continue to create,8 (2) making those rights limited enough so that the
2. Julie Zerbo, Fast Fashion, FASHION L. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.
thefashionlaw.com/learn/fast-fashions-green-initiatives-dont-believe-the-hype (defining
“fast fashion” as “the practice of rapidly translating high fashion design trends into
low-priced garments and accessories by mass-market retailers at low costs”).
3. See Nicole Martinez, How Fast Fashion Retailers Built Billion–Dollar
Businesses by Stealing Designs, ART L.J. (June 18, 2015), http://artlawjournal
.com/fast-fashion-retailers-built-billiondollar-businesses-stealing-designs/ (explaining
why fashion is not generally protected by copyright law).
4. See id. (describing how patent and trademark laws provide only limited
protections for fashion designers).
5. Id.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also Useful Articles, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/register/va-useful.html (last visited May 9, 2017) (defining
“useful articles” as those objects which have an “intrinsic utilitarian function” and
explicitly stating that “clothing” is an example of “an object having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information”).
7. Burrow–Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (defining
“author” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who
completes a work of science or literature”).
8. Specifically, giving them the ability to control how a work is initially
distributed.
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public may eventually utilize such creations, and (3) furthering the social
benefits that arise from the widespread use of creative works.9
This Article asserts that the existing intellectual property protections in
the United States fail to adequately protect garments and accessories.
While others have written extensively on the subject, none have been able
to suggest a viable approach capable of gaining enough traction in
Congress to result in adopted legislation. As a result, this Article proposes
an alternative that permits a designer to protect the “value–added” to a
useful item, while not unduly restricting the freedom of the fashion
industry to simultaneously manufacture clothing, and create and sustain
trends. Fashion is, after all, largely predicated on the use and reworking of
existing design elements and staples. This proposed approach markedly
differs from existing literature on this subject, as it calls attention to and
places substantial value in the intangible asset of reputation, an element
that proves essential to the establishment and maintenance of high fashion
and luxury brands.
Part II of this Article speaks to the widespread issue of design piracy and
the detriment it poses for the fashion industry, especially emerging design
talent. Part III concentrates on where the existing laws fall short of
adequately protecting against design piracy. This includes an examination
of the concept of useful articles, a key classification in the understanding of
copyright protection and the corresponding doctrine of separability. Both
of these principles serve as barriers to truly sufficient copyright–specific
protection of fashion designs. Part IV analyzes and identifies exactly what
we should endeavor to protect in terms of fashion designs –– namely, the
value–added elements of a design, as well as the reputation of designers
and design brands –– and how such a focus is, in fact, supported by the
language of the United States Constitution and the intent of the framers.
Ultimately, Part V considers ways to reconcile the interests of both what
and who we endeavor to protect. It proposes that the focus of such
protection should not depend on whether a garment or accessory is useful
and separable, and thus, subject to traditional copyright protection. Instead,
the focus should resemble a defamation–style analysis, as defamation law’s
goal of guarding against the tarnishment and/or diminishment of reputation
can be applied to address fast fashion retailers’ hijacking of brands’ design
signatures and more broadly, their brand images. By removing the utility
and separability inquiries from the equation, we are not only able to
9. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.” The underlying policy that drives copyright law in the United
States is encouragement of creativity so that the public can ultimately benefit).
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formulate more meaningful protection for garments and accessories, but we
are able to advance protection that addresses who we aim to protect and not
merely what we strive to protect.
II. FASHION AND THE IMPACT OF DESIGN PIRACY
Based on designs that are shown on the runway each season, fast fashion
retailers are able to build enormous businesses that rely on the practice of
design piracy.10 As a result, blatant –– yet entirely legal –– copies make it
to store shelves and e–commerce websites long before the original,
authentic designs do and for a tiny fraction of the price.11 Forever 21,
H&M, Zara, Primark, Nasty Gal, ASOS, and Topshop are just a few of the
most widely renowned fast fashion retailers, as their business models are
based almost entirely on the offering of inexpensive, line–for–line replicas
of designs of both established design houses and sought–after emerging
design labels, alike.12 Thus, enabling them to “earn a profit thanks to lower
unit costs and the avoided expense of design.”13
Such piracy commonly comes in the form of retailers replicating some of
the most striking and recognizable elements of a designer’s creation.14
Take for instance, Cushnie et Ochs’ Spider Halter Dress, a standout look
from the New York–based brand’s Fall/Winter 2011 collection.
Consumers were drawn to that dress for its ornamental design elements,
namely, the angled web–like strips of fabric that adorn the chest and ribs
portions of the dress. These design elements were uniformly cited in nearly
every fashion critic’s review of this collection. For instance, writing for
Style.com (now Vogue Runway), Alison Baenen, noted: “[e]lastic boning
— think thin strips of fabric crisscrossing the back or side of the body —
had its origins in elaborate Native American body jewelry; here it made for
sexy, organic cutouts on superbly tailored dresses in molten stretch moiré
or rich wool crepe.”15
10. See Teri Agins, Copy Shops: Fashion Knockoffs Hit Stores Before Originals as
Designers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1994, at A1.
11. Id.
12. See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of
Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1172 (2009) (describing how many retailers sell
copies of the original design at a lower quality, and profit thanks to lower unit costs and
minimal – if any – design expense).
13. Id.
14. See Nia Porter, Are High-Fashion Copies Actually Legal?, RACKED (Aug. 18,
2016, 11:02 AM), https://www.racked.com/2016/8/18/12428004/fast-fashion-copysites-legal-knockoff (detailing fast fashion retailers’ “spot on” copies of runway
designs).
15. Alison Baenen, Cushnie et Ochs Fall 2011 Ready–to–Wear, VOGUE (Feb. 12,
2011), http://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/fall-2011-ready-to-wear/cushnie-et-ochs.
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With this in mind, it should come as little surprise that in copying the
Cushnie et Ochs dress,16 ASOS, a British fast fashion giant, focused on and
incorporated these key elements in creating a replica version. ASOS’s
Midi Dress with Cut Out Panels17 contains the aforementioned design
features and placements. These value–added elements were copied
specifically to elicit the look and feel of the original design in the minds of
consumers.
Figure 1: Comparison Between Cushnie et Ochs dress (left) and ASOS’s
Midi Dress with Cut Out Panels (right)

Let us consider another example: Loéil.com’s Lighter Heeled Mules.18
The shoe, with its prominent lighter–inspired cylindrical stiletto heel, is a
dead–ringer for Paris–based “it” brand Vetements’ own Lighter Heeled
Mule,19 which it showed as part of its Spring/Summer 2016 collection to
much fanfare, media attention and editorial coverage.

16.
17.
18.
19.

See Figure 1 (left).
See Figure 1 (right).
See infra Figure 2 (right).
See infra Figure 2 (left).
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Figure 2: Comparison Between Vetements’ Lighter Heeled Mule (left)
and Loéil.com’s Lighter Heeled Mules (right).

Another illustration comes from Joseph Altuzarra’s Spring/Summer
2015 collection, namely, his latticework leather skirt,20 which was a
noteworthy design in this specific collection.21 Not long after Altuzarra’s
runway show, a highlight of the bi-annual New York Fashion Week
calendar, Nasty Gal began offering its “Laser Cut Skirt” for sale.22 The
copy bears markedly similar design elements, including, the diamondshape cut–outs, front slit, and long leather–ribbon waist closure.
Figure 3: Comparison between Joseph Altuzarra’s Spring/Summer 2015
latticework leather skirt (left) and Nasty Gal “Laser Cut Skirt” (right).

20. See Figure 3 (left).
21. See Nicole Phelps, Altuzarra Spring 2015 Ready-to-Wear, VOGUE (Sept. 6,

2014), http://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/spring-2015-ready-to-wear/altuzarra (des
cribing the design as having “[f]etish–y leather latticework pieces”).
22. See Figure 3 (right).
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Still yet, another recurring target of design piracy is Proenza Schouler.23
In the past several years alone, Target, Steve Madden, Nasty Gal, Forever
21, and ASOS have offered versions of the brand’s famed PS1 and PS11
handbag styles, two of “the most knocked off designs on the market
today.”24 This prompted the label’s co–founder, Lazaro Hernandez, to
speak out on behalf of one of the recent bills proposing an amendment to
the Copyright Act to include sui generis protection for fashion designs.25
As intellectual property scholars Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk aptly
noted in their own study of the state of protections for fashion designs,
fast–fashion copying is dangerous.26 It “pulls the direction of innovation
toward fashion’s status conferral aspects and away from its expressive
aspects.”27 Professor Amy Landers echoed this sentiment, writing:
“[f]ashion knockoffs present a problem that is not faced in other industries
. . . . The early replication of one or a few early designs can be
problematic.”28
The negative effects borne from design piracy extend beyond fast
fashion retailers’ ability to rapidly manufacture and offer copies for sale at
a fraction of the cost. Such tactics also serve to directly undermine the
cycle of legitimate fashion design:
The most striking consequence of low–cost, high–scale, rapid copying is
not in beating an original to market, but in the ability to wait and see
which designs succeed, and copy only those. Copyists can choose a
target after retailers have made their buying decisions, or even after the
product reaches stores, and customers have begun to buy. Such copyists
can reach market well before the relevant trend has ended.29

Furthermore, fast fashion–style copying presents additional adversities.
From a designer’s perspective, there are two primary issues: (1) the loss of
sales and licensing deals that result from widespread copying and (2) the
less tangible but potentially even more harmful effect of damage to their
brand image as a result of the proliferation of cheap knockoffs, which
directly correlates to sales.30 The following sections will examine these
23. About, PROENZA SCHOULER, https://www.proenzaschouler.com/about/ (last
visited May 9, 2017) (describing Proenza Schouler as a New York based womenswear
and accessories brand).
24. Hernandez Statement, supra note 1, at 6.
25. See generally id.
26. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 12, at 1170.
27. Id.
28. Amy L. Landers, The Anti–Economy of Fashion; An Openwork Approach to
Intellectual Property Protection, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 427,
501 (2014).
29. Id. at 1171.
30. Distinct from copyright and/or trademark infringing goods and counterfeits,
knockoffs, which are defined as unauthorized copies or imitations of a product, are
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issues in turn.
A. Loss of Sales and Business Opportunities
The cost of producing a collection and showing it during one of the
respective seasonal fashion weeks in the form of a presentation or runway
show is very costly.31 Brands routinely spend at least $100,000 for one
season.32 With these up–front expenses, the subsequent sale of garments is
essential to the viability of a brand.
While the overwhelming belief is that low–priced knockoffs have very
minimal, if any, effect on the sale of luxury items,33 this is not entirely
correct. Even as Hernandez states:
Designers are only able to recoup their investments when they later offer
their own affordable ready–to–wear lines based on those high end
collections. They then can lower the prices at which their designs are sold
because they sell more of them. Just like other businesses –– it’s dependent
on volume.34

This problem has been compounded in recent years as a result of the
downturn in the global economy. For instance, the Great Recession35 has
had significant and enduring effects on the state of fashion, including
styling and merchandizing, which impacts consumer buying practices.36
As Harper’s Bazaar journalist Anamaria Wilson wrote in 2008, “[f]inancial
woes are putting fashion lovers in a panic. Survive with one big–ticket
item, something in between, or a little bit of both.”37 As such, it is no
legally permissible because they do not make use of legally protected intellectual
property.
31. See Guy Trebay, At Marc Jacobs, the Show Before the Show, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/fashion/17Curtain.html.
32. Id.; see also Hernandez Statement, supra note 1, at 2 (“Just one of our
collections –– and we produce 4 collections a year –– costs $3.8 million. The cost of a
typical show is approximately $320,000.”).
33. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2006)
(arguing that pirated designs increase awareness for the original designs and, thus, can
have a potentially positive effect on the original, in addition to ensuring the
proliferation of trends and innovation in the industry).
34. Hernandez Statement, supra note 1, at 4.
35. The Great Recession, ST. OF WORKING AM., http://stateofworkingamerica.
org/great-recession/ (last visited May 9, 2017) (explaining that the Great Recession was
a period of economic downturn that lasted from approximately December 2007 to June
2009).
36. Lee Joon–Hawn et. al., Fast Fashion: Out–of–the–Box Thinking in the Apparel
Industry, SAMSUNG ECON. RES. INST. 3, 6–7 (May 2011) (explaining the recession’s
impact on fash-ion).
37. Anamaria Wilson, Gucci or Gas?, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Aug. 27, 2008),
http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/fashion-articles/gucci-or-gas-0908.
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longer taboo to mix high fashion and fast fashion, something that
represented a significant fashion misstep in prior generations.38
Consequently, it is not uncommon to see high fashion shoppers dipping
their toes in the pool of fast fashion for certain items.39 Furthermore,
consumers have become less loyal to their favorite high fashion brands.40
Women that once only wore head–to–toe designer looks have branched out
by way of more individualized, diversified looks. This results in wardrobes
that seamlessly combine both high fashion garments and accessories, with
less investment–worthy articles.
In terms of sales, “the entry of a knockoff has an overall negative effect
on the financial performance of the original,”41 because “[t]hey cut into
sales.”42 While this was an unpopular and largely unfounded notion as
recently as a decade ago, the shift in consumer activity has made it so that
the effect on sales is not only well–documented, but can be perceived in
two distinct ways. First, there is the issue of substitution, which represents
the loss of sales due to individuals buying a knockoff –– a Balenciaga copy
from Zara in lieu of the real thing, for instance –– instead of the original
design.43 Second, there is the loss of sales that “occurs when a design
becomes more ubiquitous as a result of the knockoff.”44 Both serve as
roadblocks for designers that are either aiming to profit directly from sales
of their original designs or to parlay their original designs into more
affordable versions.45
In terms of the latter, an increasingly popular approach for designers to
38. The stigma that comes with mainstream collections, which had a hand in
destroying the appeal of designer Roy Halston Frowick’s main collection in the 1980"s,
is long gone. Frowick, professionally known as Halston, signed on to do a collection
with JC Penney in the 1980"s. When he teamed up with the retailer for a line of
affordable dresses in 1983, one of his most celebrated stockists, Bergdorf Goodman,
immediately dropped his collection from its store floor for fear that Halston’s
association with JC Penney would hamper the luxury image of his main collection.
39. See Ruth La Ferla, Zara, Where Insiders Look for an Edge, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/fashion/zara-where-insiders-look-for-anedge.html? (stating that even high fashion shoppers “tap Zara routinely, and repeatedly,
for timely, decently priced approximations of the runways’ greatest hits”).
40. See Steve Olenski, Only One Quarter of American Consumers Are Brand
Loyal, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2012, 8:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/
2012/03/26/only-one-quarter-of-american-consumers-are-brand-loyal/.
41. Gil Appel, Barak Libai & Eitan Muller, The Short and Long-term Impacts of
Fashion Knockoffs on Original Items, MKTG. SCI. INST. (2013), http://www.msi.org/
reports/the-short-and-long-term-impacts-of-fashion-knockoffs-on-original-items.
42. Robin Givhan, The End of ‘Gown in 60 Seconds’?, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
2007, at C02.
43. See Appel et al., supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. See generally id.
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profit from their original creations is by partnering with a mass–market
retailer, such as Target, J. Crew, the Gap, Uniqlo, and H&M, to produce
low–priced collections based on their main line for a more expansive
audience.46 In essence, they partner to create authorized or licensed fast
fashion copies.
Widespread design piracy, however, can prove a hindrance to the
establishment of such partnerships. This “[d]esign piracy makes it difficult
for a designer to move from higher priced fashion to developing affordable
renditions for a wider audience. It also makes it impossible to sell
collections to stores when the clothes have already been knocked off.”47
This is, in part, because mass–market retailers have far less incentive to pay
–– oftentimes, large sums48 –– to partner with a designer or design brand if
it is already stocking unauthorized copies of that brand, and thereby
unofficially benefiting from the association with the brand. For example, if
unauthorized replicas of Proenza Schouler’s well–known PS1 handbag and
garments bearing the brand’s design signatures are readily available from
third–party manufacturers, a fast fashion retailer, in an effort to keep costs
low, is more likely to stock those goods rather than to pay to partner with
Proenza Schouler. It would therefore, choose the third–party manufacturer
over licensing Proenza Schouler’s name and associated intellectual
property in furtherance of an official collection.
B. Reputational Harm and Damage to a Brand’s Identity
The less tangible, but equally –– if not more harmful –– issue is the
reputational damage that comes about as a result of the saturation (or the
appearance of saturation) of the market with copies of a designer’s original
creations.49 This is particularly true if the garments and/or accessories are
46. See Steff Yotka, Every H&M Fashion Collaboration, Ranked, VOGUE (Oct. 19,
2016, 1:06 PM), http://www.vogue.com/article/hm-designer-collaborations-ranked
(listing H&M’s collaborative projects with high end brands/designers, such as:
Chanel’s creative director Karl Lagerfeld, former Lanvin creative director Alber Elbaz,
Versace, Alexander Wang, Matthew Williamson, Stella McCartney, Balmain, Jimmy
Choo, Maison Martin Margiela, Isabel Marant, Marni, and Kenzo); see also Kerry
Folan, Target’s Collab History: A Timeline, RACKED (June 25, 2012, 10:30 AM), https
://www.racked.com/2012/6/25/7720279/targets-collab-history-a-timeline (providing a
list of brands/designers that collaborated with Target, such as: Missoni, Alexander
McQueen, Proenza Schouler, Rodarte, Jason Wu, Jean Paul Gaultier, and Liberty of
London).
47. Hernandez Statement, supra note 1, at 4.
48. See Eric Wilson, A Marriage of Economic Convenience, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/fashion/designer-retailer-union-remainslucrative.html (explaining that designers who have partnered with H&M to license their
name and design signatures have been paid approximately one million dollars for such
a collaboration).
49. See Julie Zerbo, Fashion in an Industry Filled with Fakes, FASHION L. (Feb. 11,
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of significantly inferior quality, which they most commonly are.50 In
addition to the loss of revenue that results from the sale of knockoffs,
design piracy stands to tarnish and/or diminish a brand’s reputation and
goodwill.51 This is a major barrier for young designers, in particular, who
are working to establish their identity in the marketplace.52
When a brand becomes synonymous with mass–market availability in
the mind of luxury shoppers, in particular, this can be a death knell for the
brand because “in fashion, reputation matters, and overexposure plays a
large role in this. It undermines a luxury brand’s identity, which is often
based on ideals of grandeur and exclusivity, and often leads the discerning
consumer to look to another brand that still has its image of exclusivity,
and thus, luxury, in check.”53
As designers work to develop a brand, they become known for signature
designs and/or aesthetics, which thereby enable them to stand out in a
market filled with talent and similarly situated brands. For instance, Thom
Browne, a New York–based menswear designer, is known for the
exaggerated and distinct proportions of his namesake suiting.54
2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/tbt-fashion-in-an-industry-filled-with-fakes (“
Not only are brands losing sales to fast fashion retailers, they stand to lose their air of
exclusivity as copies are widely available.”); see also Andrew Roberts, Less Is More as
Vuitton Stays Atop Luxury List in Brands Ranking, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2014, 7:01
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-20/less-is-more-as-vuittonstays-top-luxury-brand-in-ranking (“If you lose exclusivity, you lose your luxury
status.”).
50. See, e.g., Marc Bain, Burberry Is Suing J.C. Penney for “Inferior Quality”
Knockoffs of Its Famous Check Pattern, QUARTZ (Feb. 10, 2016), https://qz.com
/614024/burberry-is-suing-j-c-penney-for-inferior-quality-knockoffs-of-its-famouscheck-pattern/ (describing the inferior quality of a knockoff scarf).
51. See Givhan, supra note 42, at C02.
52. Hernandez Statement, supra note 1, at 4.
53. Julie Zerbo, Louis Vuitton and the Danger of Over-Exposure, FASHION L. (Apr.
30, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/louis-vuitton-the-danger-of-over-ex posure.
54. Guy Trebay, Being Thom Browne: His Moment Is Now, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/fashion/the-designer-thom-browne-is-inhis-moment.html?pagewanted=all (“An expanse of hairy leg stretched between trouser
hem and shoe, an unsettling bit of erogenous peekaboo that is a Thom Browne
signature” and “what once looked weird now seems oddly proportionate and correct”);
see also Mary Katrantzou, BRIT. FASHION COUNCIL, http://www.Britishfashion
council.com/designer_profile.aspx?DesignerID=939 (last visited May 9, 2017)
(explaining that London–based Mary Katrantzou’s name is synonymous with her
“hyperrealist aesthetic, bold graphics and industrial jewellery”); Emily Farra, Monse
Fall 2017 Ready-to-Wear, VOGUE (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.vogue.com/fashionshows/fall-2017-ready-to-wear/monse (noting that Monse, the emerging New York–
based brainchild of Laura Kim and Fernando Garcia, is known for its sought–after
“Monse–isms,” which include intricate crafted shirting designs and “twisted tailoring”);
Alexander Fury, A Screw Loose: The Secret of Rei Kawakubo’s Signature Look,
INDEP. (June 28, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/fashion/news/a-screwloose-the-secret-of-rei-kawakubos-signature-look-8679284.html (stating that Rei
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When fast fashion retailers flood the market with inexpensively made
and very modestly priced garments and accessories that are blatant rip–offs
of designers’ original garments and accessories –– particularly those
derived from designers’ brand signatures –– it creates the appearance of
saturation, and thus, accessibility.55
This thereby, undermines the
foundation of high fashion, which is based not only on quality and
originality, but exclusivity, as well.56 This can have a damning effect on a
brand’s image, and “the dilution of a design can cut into sales, for instance,
when a design [falls out of favor] in the industry [because] it becomes too
widespread or associated with a less exclusive image.”57
III. WHY EXISTING LAW IS NOT ENOUGH
Existing forms of intellectual property in the U.S. fall short in protecting
fashion designs in large part because they prove either to be substantively
or procedurally challenging. A brief review of the applicable forms of
intellectual property that exist in the U.S. –– beginning with trademark and
patent law, followed by a more in–depth examination on copyright law ––
demonstrates that these doctrines fail to provide adequate protection for
garments and accessories.
A. Trademark and Trade Dress
Trademark protection generally extends to “any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination [used] to identify and distinguish goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and

Kawakubo, the mastermind behind Comme des Garçons, has been recognized for the
distress and decay of her clothing. Some of her earliest designs included “random holes
in the garments . . . the fabrics were creased and rumpled, felted, with seams exposed.
Some had raw–edged panels peeling away”).
55. See Julie Zerbo, Is the Internet Era Slowly Killing High Fashion?, FASHION L.
(May 8, 2014) [hereinafter Zerbo, Internet Era], http://www.thefashionlaw.com/is-theinternet-era-slowly-killing-high-fashion (explaining that the downsides of the instantaneous nature of modern-day fashion is the “increased speed of copying and the overall
dilution of the essence of high fashion, which whether you like it or not is founded on
exclusivity and unattainability”).
56. See id.; see also Deepti Chaudhary, We Strengthen Ties by Selling a Dream:
Fendi CEO, FORBES INDIA (Nov. 12, 2014), http://forbesindia.com/article/best-thingsmoney-can-buy/we-strengthen-ties-by-selling-a-dream-fendiceo/38971/1#ixzz3JYmjEr9h (“At Fendi, we are constantly trying to strengthen our ties
with the audience by selling a dream, selling a lifestyle, and offering our customers a
luxurious taste of our products.”).
57. Silvia Beltrametti, Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Is the Cure
Worse Than the Disease? An Analogy with Counterfeiting and A Comparison with the
Protection Available in the European Community, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147,
160 (2010).
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to indicate the source of the goods.”58 This type of protection most
commonly extends to a designer or brand’s logo or name in accordance
with the Lanham Act and state trademark law.59 However, because this
protection is limited to the trademark specimen alone, it is not broad
enough to protect the underlying fashion designs, themselves.60
Trade dress61 may, on its face, seem fitting for fashion designs.
However, much like classic trademark protection, it is not ideal for the vast
majority of designs.62 In order to be protected as trade dress, a product
must entail distinctiveness in the marketplace, either because (1) such
distinctiveness is inherent or (2) it results from the development of
“secondary meaning” in the minds of consumers.63 The “secondary
meaning” standard is a markedly difficult one to meet, as it requires the
expenditure of great amounts of time and resources.64 For example, the
appearance of a Birkin bag –– which historic French house Hermès began
producing in 1984 and is one of the most famous handbags in history –– is
an example of a design that embodies the requisite level of secondary
meaning and thus, is subject to trade dress protection.65
Given the resource–intensive nature of establishing secondary meaning,
as is required for trade dress protection, this is an arguably ill–fitting form
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125; see also State Trademark Information Links, USPTO,

https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/process-overview/state-trademarkinformation-links (last modified Jan. 10, 2017) (listing state trademark laws).
60. Martinez, supra note 3.
61. Trade Dress, CORNELL L. INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trade_
dress (last visited May 9, 2017) (defining trade dress as “[t]he design and shape of the
materials in which a product is packaged. Product configuration, the design and shape
of the product itself, may also be considered a form of trade dress”); see also Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992); Am. Greetings Corp. v.
Dan–Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141(3d Cir. 1986); Rose Art Indus., Inc. v.
Raymond Geddes & Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D.N.J. 1998)).
62. See generally Jennifer S. Shultz & Jessica Bruder, Design Patents and Trade
Dress: A Fashion Pairing as Good as Dolce & Gabbana, FASHION L. BRIEFS (June 30,
2016), http://documents.lexology.com/d0910bb5-5cd6-4430-9907-7ad01c95fdf e. pdf.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
64. In order to claim trade dress infringement in connection with a product’s
design, one must first establish that the trade dress has obtained “secondary meaning”
or “acquired distinctiveness” in the marketplace. In other words, a designer must show
that the public associates the product design with the particular producer of the goods
or services. This may be established through a showing of a combination of the
following six factors: “(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the
mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5)
attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.”
(Cartier Inc. v. Sardell Jewelry, Inc, 294 F. App’x 615 (2d Cir. 2008)).
65. See generally Hermés Int’l v. Emperia, Inc., No. 2:14–CV–03522-SVW-VBK
(C.D. Cal. 2014).
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of protection for nearly all but the most established, well–funded design
houses.
B. Patent
Patent law provides a significant amount of protection for fashion
designs. Design patents, in particular, protect the appearance of an “article
of manufacture” that is “new, original and ornamental,” such as some
garments and accessories.66 While this form of protection is being
increasingly utilized by established brands for their staple products and/or
best–selling goods, it is not ideal for most fashion designs.67 This is
primarily because it entails a time–consuming filing and pendency process
that is not cohesive with the rapid turnaround time that comes hand–in–
hand with the highly seasonal nature of the fashion industry.68 Within the
average patent pendency time of roughly 19.9 months,69 a womenswear–
only fashion brand will have shown seven collections.70 Moreover, within
that year and a half time frame, before the patent is even issued, at least
three of the seven collections that were shown on the runway will have
been sold in stores and be “so last season,” making a patent for anything
other than staple items that will be reintroduced after more than one season
virtually useless (particularly given that fast fashion retailers tend to beat
the original designer item to stores).
Further complicating matters is the fact that design patents entail a costly
process.71 This makes them unattractive and/or unrealistic for the vast
majority of design brands, which operate as small businesses.72
C. Copyright
On its face, copyright law appears to be an effective doctrine to protect
fashion designs. While garments and accessories are not explicitly cited in
the list of copyrightable subject matter set out in Section 101 of the
66. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
67. See generally GUILLERMO C. JIMENEZ & BARBARA KOLSUN, FASHION LAW: A

GUIDE FOR DESIGNERS, FASHION EXECUTIVES, AND ATTORNEYS 55-65 (2d ed. 2014).
68. See id. (“Patents are relatively expensive and time–consuming.”).
69. Remy Yucel, Patent Operations Update, USPTO (May 5, 2016), https:// www
.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20160505_PPAC_Operations_Update.pdf.
70. For instance: Fall/Winter 2017, Pre–Fall 2017, Spring/Summer 2017, Resort
2017, Fall/Winter 2016, and Pre–Fall 2016. See Pamela Simmons, When Do Fashion
Seasons Start?, LEAF, https://www.leaf.tv/articles/when-do-fashion-seasons-start/ (last
visited May 9, 2017) (describing the four main fashion seasons).
71. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWatchdog (Apr.
4, 2015) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-theus/id=56485/ (stating that an “extremely simply” design patent costs between “$5,000
to $7,000”).
72. JIMENEZ & KOLSUN, supra note 67, at 61.
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Copyright Act,73 this does not preclude them from protection because this
list is non–exhaustive.74 Additionally, case law suggests that fashion
designs do, in fact, fall under the umbrella of copyright.75
To date, copyright law has provided protection for creative expressions
within the realm of fashion, including, but not limited to, “original prints
and patterns, unique color arrangements, and novel combinations of
elements used on apparel or accessories.”76 In connection with such works,
copyright law gives owners “the exclusive right to make copies, prepare
derivative works, sell or distribute copies, and display the work publicly.”77
Problematic, however, is the fact that copyright protection does not
extend to useful articles, such as garments and accessories, in their entirety,
as copyright law does not protect functionality.78 Copyright law was
“never intended to nor would the Constitution permit them to protect
monopolies on useful articles.”79 As a result, separability is a prerequisite
to copyright protection for the design of a useful article.80 In accordance
73. Works of authorship that fall within the scope of protection of the Copyright
Act of 1976 include: “(1) literary works, including computer programs in source code
or object code, databases, operating systems programs embedded in ROMS, PROMS,
etc., and microcode; (2) musical works and any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works and any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51 (1976) (“Section 102 implies neither that
subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that general area of
subject matter would necessarily be unprotected.”).
75. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 533 (2013)
(“[W]ithout some such qualification a copyright holder could prevent a buyer from
domestically reselling or even giving away copies of a video game made in Japan, a
film made in Germany, or a dress (with a design copyright) made in China, even if the
copyright holder has granted permission for the foreign manufacture, importation, and
an initial domestic sale of the copy.”); see also Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017) (“We hold that an artistic feature of the design of a
useful article [a cheerleading uniform in this case] is eligible for copyright
protection.”).
76. Oliver Herzfeld, Protecting Fashion Designs, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013, 9:14 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/01/03/protecting-fashion-designs
/#7462b37bb317.
77. Copyright Registration for Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ40.pdf (last modified Sept.
2015).
78. See Herzfeld, supra note 76 (explaining that while copyright law provides
protection for novel combinations of elements embodied in apparel or accessories, this
protection does not extend to the designs themselves).
79. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980).
80. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B][3] (2000);
see also Raymond M. Polakovic, Comment, Should the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright
Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual Separability, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 874 (1993)
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with the legislative intent that underlies the Copyright Act:
The shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and
valuable, [but] the Committee’s intention is not to offer it copyright
protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane,
ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial
product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the
design would not be copyrighted under the bill.81

A “useful article” is one that has “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information.”82 This classification is germane, as useful articles83 are
subject to the separability construct that courts use to determine whether
the design of a useful article qualifies for copyright protection as a
“[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural” (“PGS”) work.84
The PGS work that is protected under Section 101 includes: “two–
dimensional and three–dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”85 These
works are protectable:
[I]nsofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall
be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.86

Following therefrom, the corresponding copyright inquiry when a useful
article is involved takes the form of a newly–clarified two–step test, as set

(“In determining whether a useful article should be copyrightable, the court must
decide whether the artistic element of the article is separable from its utilitarian
application.”). Until very recently, separability was broken into two separate doctrines
depending on jurisdiction: physical and conceptual separability. However, this
distinction was later eliminated. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1002, 1016 (2017) (“[W]e necessarily abandon the distinction between ‘physical’ and
‘conceptual’ separability, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on
the Copyright Act’s legislative history.”).
81. H.R. REP. at 105; S. REP. NO. 94–473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 86–87 (1975).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
83. Copyright: Useful Articles, FL–103, LIBRARY OF CONG. (Dec. 2011) http://
www.copyright.gov/fls/fl103.html (explaining that useful articles include: “clothing;
automobile bodies; furniture; machinery, including household appliances; dinnerware;
and lighting fixtures”).
84. See id.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
86. Id.
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forth by the Supreme Court in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. 87
In that case, the Court held that:
[A] feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for
copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two–or
three–dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2)
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—
either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—
if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is
incorporated.88

The doctrine of conceptual separability has strong foundational roots in
the Second Circuit, particularly in a string of cases following the enactment
of the Copyright Act of 1976, and has since been interpreted by several
other circuits.89 For instance, in 1980, the Second Circuit initially looked
to the issue of separability under the Copyright Act in Kieselstein–Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc.90 The court in this case held that two decorative
belt buckles were subject to copyright protection.91 The court followed up
this case, which is discussed in more depth below, with Carol Barnhart
Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,92 in which it applied a variation of its
conceptual separability test, and ultimately found that clothing mannequins
were not protectable by copyright law.93
In terms of Supreme Court treatment of conceptual separability, the
Court held in Mazer v. Stein94 that the base design of a lamp, which
consisted of statuettes, was protectable by copyright law, despite the
utilitarian nature of the lamp, itself.95 The Court explained that “the use or
intended use of the statuettes in lamp bases did not bar their subsequent
registration as copyrightable works of art.”96 The Court allowed for their
87. 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
88. Id.
89. See Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.

denied, No. 14–396, 2014 WL 5025796 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2014); Universal Furniture Int’l,
Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010); Galiano v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans
Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc.,
912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir.
1983); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983);
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
90. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 994.
92. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 421.
94. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
95. Id. at 214.
96. Id.; see also Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
109, 117 (2008).
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protection as “works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form, but
not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”97
The less commonly applied standard of physical separability98 is also
worth noting, albeit very briefly. In Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,99 the court
addressed “whether the overall shape of a utilitarian object is an article
eligible for copyright protection.”100 Specifically, the case centered on the
protectability of the artistic design of lighting fixtures as a whole.101 The
court held that the fixtures contained no elements capable of independent
existence as copyrightable works of art apart from their utilitarian aspect.102
The court explained that the “overall design or configuration of a utilitarian
object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional
considerations, is not eligible for copyright.”103 The court differentiated the
lighting fixtures at issue from those in Mazer because the Mazer “statuettes
were undeniably capable of existing as a work of art independent of the
utilitarian article into which they were incorporated. And they were clearly
a ‘feature’ segregable from the overall shape of the table lamps.”104
Looking to an array of fashion–centric cases, in which the separability
requirement is applied, is telling of what elements of a design are simply
too “utilitarian” to be called “design.” Generally speaking, these cases can
be divided into two categories: (1) those that provide a thin level of
copyright protection and (2) those that fail entirely to provide any copyright
protection for the designs at issue.
1. Cases that Provide a Thin Copyright for Fashion Designs
One of the most highly cited and most generously protective cases in the
realm of separability is Kieselstein–Cord.105 In this case, a manufacturer of
fine jewelry, belt buckles, and leather goods filed a copyright infringement
claim, alleging that a knockoff manufacturer was copying its belt buckle
design and creating inexpensive knockoffs.106 The court found that the
97. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949)).
98. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017)

(“[W]e necessarily abandon the distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’
separability, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on the
Copyright Act’s legislative history.”).
99. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
100. Id. at 804.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See generally Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d
Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 991.

2017

PROTECTING FASHION DESIGNS

613

knockoff manufacturer had been constructing “line–for–line copies . . .
made of common metal rather than precious metal” in violation of
manufacturer’s copyright.107 The court held that “elements that ‘physically
or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects
of’ a useful article”108 are protectable by copyright law. Consequently, the
court found that the plaintiff’s belt buckles contained “conceptually
separable sculptural elements, as apparently have the buckles’ wearers who
have used them as ornamentation for parts of the body other than the
waist,”109 and that the “primary ornamental aspect of the . . . buckles is
conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function.”110 As a
result, the court found that the defendant’s near–exact copies of the
plaintiff’s buckles amounted to copyright infringement.111 The rest of the
belt design, however, did not receive protection.112
Additionally, in Express, LLC v. Fetish Group, Inc.,113 the court held that
“lace and embroidery accents that were totally irrelevant to the utilitarian
functions” of a women’s shirt may be subject to a “thin copyright.”114 In
that case, Express, an American retail chain, argued for “copyright
protection for the decorative details and look of [its] GH268 Tunic as a
whole,”115 but the court ultimately concluded, “the embroidery design is the
only aspect of the GH268 Tunic entitled to copyright protection.”116 The
court, thereby granted Express much more limited copyright protection in
terms of scope than it had hoped for, removing from the scope of protection
“the placement of the lace along the hemline, bustline, etc.” and protection
for the tunic as a whole.117
In another case, Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc.,118 a knitwear manufacturer
filed suit against Express, for allegedly infringing the copyright in its Aran
fisherman’s sweater.119 In regards to the availability of copyright
protection for the cable design on Banff Ltd.’s sweaters, the court held that
the single design aspect, itself, was copyright protected (as distinct from
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 54–55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668).
109. Id. at 993.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See generally, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
114. See Id. at 1216.
115. Id. at 1218.
116. Id. at 1222.
117. Id. at 1221.
118. 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
119. Id. at 1067.
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entire sweater), and therefore, Express was liable for infringing upon the
copyright.120
The most recent treatment of garments in connection with the doctrine of
separability comes by way of the Supreme Court. In Star Athletica, while
the Court explicitly refused to determine whether the specific uniforms at
issue are “sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection,”121 it did
hold that “two–dimensional designs — consisting of various lines,
chevrons, and colorful shapes—appearing on the surface of the
cheerleading uniforms” are, in fact, protectable by copyright law.122 As
further noted by the Court, such protection extends only to the design
created by the “surface designs on a uniform.”123 It does not cover the
“shape, cut, or dimensions to the uniforms.”124
2. Cases that Fail to Find Separability, and Thus, Rule Out Copyright
Protection for Fashion Designs
In Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions,125 a manufacturer of special
occasion dresses alleged that the decoration of a dress warranted copyright
protection.126 The manufacturer argued that the decoration, itself, did not
serve as a useful article because it only contributed to the appearance of the
dress.127 The court disagreed, holding that the “artistic judgment exercised
in applying sequins and crystals to a dress’s bodice and in using ruched
satin at the waist and layers of tulle in the skirt”128 did not meet the
standard for separability required to achieve copyright protection.129
Instead, the design only served to “enhance the functionality of the dress as
clothing for a special occasion,”130 and “the aesthetic merged with the
functional to cover the body in a particularly attractive way for that special
occasion.”131 As a result, the court held that the prom dress lacked
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 n.1 (2017).
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1006.
Id.
500 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1596 (2013), reh’g
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2821 (2013). Though not a precedential decision, the opinion serves
as an indication of how courts may rule on the issue of separability in cases involving
fashion designs.
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. (finding that “the prom dress at issue merits copyright protection because its
design constitutes a combination of features ‘that can be identified separately from and
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article’”).
128. Id. at 45.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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copyrightable elements, and thus, the knockoff manufacturer was not liable
for copyright infringement for creating and selling a nearly exact copy.132
Similarly, in Morris v. Buffalo Chips Bootery, Inc.,133 the court held that
the elements implicit in the design of a vest and a dress, which included
“handmade unique leather artwork,” were not protectable by copyright law,
as they lacked separability.134 The court stated, “[e]ach and every arguably
aesthetic element of [fashion designer Ligia Morris]’s designs plays a
utilitarian function in the clothing in which it is embodied.”135 It further
held that the fashion designer “failed to specify in any objectively
identifiable fashion the copyrightable elements of her designs that are
capable of existing independently of the articles of clothing themselves,”136
which is “fatal” to her copyright claim.137 Essentially, “the artistic and the
functional elements of [Morris]’s designs are inextricably interwoven in the
articles of clothing in which they appear”138 and as a result, they did not
amount to articles that could be protected by copyright law.
In Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl’s Department Stores,139 a shoe designer claimed
copyright infringement based on allegations that a department store copied
one of his shoe designs. According to the shoe designer, the original shoe
at issue consisted of “patterned stitching on the front and sides of the shoe,
a strap with visible stitching, and a sole with a pattern of spots that wraps
around the shoe and extends up the back, sides, and front.”140 The court
declined to find that the design elements at issue were sufficiently
separable from the functional components of the shoe, itself, to warrant
copyright protection. The court stated, “[u]nlike a fanciful design on the
base of a lamp, or the ornamentation on a belt buckle, the features of the
SHOE design described by [the shoe designer] are not purely aesthetic.”141
It continued on to state:
Removing the strap, stitching, or sole of a shoe would, to some degree,
adversely impact a wearer’s ability to locomote by foot, either because
the shoe would fall off (without a strap), fall apart (without stitching), or
provide no protection against the ground (without a sole). Nor could any
of the design elements, once removed, be separately sold or exist as an

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
160 F. Supp. 2d 718 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. 06 Civ 195(GEL), 2006 WL 2645196, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *12.
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independent work of art.142

Furthermore, the court in Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co.143 held that
garments in their entirety are not subject to copyright protection.144 In that
case, in which a copyright infringement claim centered on the design of
uniforms for casino employees, the court held that although “there is little
doubt that clothing possesses utilitarian and aesthetic value,”145 the
question of “[h]ow to conduct the conceptual separation is . . . what
continues to flummox federal courts.”146 Ultimately, the court applied the
“likelihood–of–marketability”147 standard for garment design, which
essentially views a design as conceptually separable if it would have
market value on its own. Thus, the court held that absent a showing that
the design of casino uniforms was independently marketable, there was no
copyright infringement.148
In Poe v. Missing Persons,149 a fashion designer argued that a clear
plastic bikini filled with crushed rock was conceptual art, not a swimsuit.
The court held:
Nothing in our legal training qualifies us to determine whether the work,
entitled, Acquaint No. 5, can be worn as an article of clothing for
swimming or any other utilitarian purpose. We are also unable to
determine merely by looking at [the fashion designer]’s creation whether
a person wearing this object can move, walk, swim, sit, stand, or lie
down without unwelcome or unintended exposure.150

The court did not decide whether the work in question was or was not
protected by copyright.151 However, it did hold that there was a disputed
issue of material fact as to whether the sculptural work in question was a
useful article.152
From these cases, it can be determined that when garments and
accessories are at issue, courts are extremely hesitant to provide copyright
protection. For that reason, it is not difficult to see how copyright law, in
its current state, is not an entirely sufficient form of protection for the
majority of fashion designs.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at *11.
416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 421.
Id.
745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
Id.
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In order to determine whether a useful article, such as a garment or
accessory, should fall under the umbrella of copyright protection, a court
must decide whether the artistic element(s) of the article is separable from
its utilitarian application.153 Such separability is a prerequisite to copyright
protection for the design of a useful article. This is where we routinely
experience notable difficulty in terms of considering copyright protection
for fashion designs. Under the Copyright Act, there is a prohibition against
the protection of utilitarian aspects of clothes that would otherwise amount
to copyrightable material.154 As such, utilitarian items are typically not
covered under the copyright regime, but instead, fall under the jurisdiction
of patent law. Thus, the challenge, in terms of copyright law, is the
absence of a gray area; once an object, such as a dress or a shoe, is
classified as useful in nature, that object as a whole will not be granted
copyright protection.
IV. NOT ONLY “WHAT?” BUT “WHO?”
As previously explained, existing intellectual property law fails to
provide fitting protection for fashion designs. These shortcomings arise
from an overarching focus on what we would like to protect, in lieu of
considering who we aim to protect.155
While discussions over how best to protect fashion designs are
important, they often omit considerations of a more primary inquiry: what
exactly was intellectual property law, as a whole, intended to protect? Very
little, if any, of the existing scholarship that focuses on legislation for
fashion designs explicitly takes the full extent of this fundamental inquiry
into account.
This is undoubtedly a complex issue, especially in the realm of fashion
because the exact appeal of a garment or accessory can be difficult to
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article.”).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
155. To date, most scholarship in this realm has been dedicated to discussions of the
requisite level of protection – primarily copyright in nature – that should be provided
for fashion designs, including the duration of that protection (three years, as opposed to
the standard life of the author plus seventy years duration for copyrights), the pleading
standards that are appropriate for such lawsuits, and the level of similarity required for
copying to constitute infringement. The most recent version of proposed fashionfocused legislation, the Innovative Design Protection Act, requires that the secondary
design be “substantially identical” to the original rather than “substantially similar.”
Such discussions were also carried out in connection with two other relatively recent
fashion-related Copyright Act amendment bills, Design Piracy Prohibition Act and
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act.
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distinctly pinpoint. Nonetheless, this is the core issue in the discussion of
legislation and one that simply cannot be left unexplored. In fact, before
we can adequately establish pleading and infringement requirements,
duration standards, and draft legislation – copyright or otherwise – that is
worthy of ratification (as we have not yet been able to accomplish), the
dialogue must revolve around identifying and clearly expressing the full
extent of what it is that intellectual property law aims to protect.
Dating back to the Statute of Anne,156 “the first statute of all time to
specifically recognize the rights of authors and the foundation of all
subsequent legislation on the subject of copyright both [in England] and
abroad,”157 it is clear that creators represent the crux of the intent behind
copyright protections. In fact, it has been posited that “the most significant
shift in English law was [the Statute of Anne’s] recognition of the rights of
authors, and not merely those of printers and booksellers.”158
The preamble of the Statute of Anne takes a marked focus on the author,
his rights and the impact of infringement on his livelihood:
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently
taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing, or causing to be
printed, reprinted, and published, books and other writings, without the
consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their
very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families:
for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for the
encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books.159

Thereafter, and even prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the
state of Massachusetts, in as early as March 1783, enacted legislation,
entitled, “[a]n act for the purpose of securing to authors, the exclusive right
and benefit of publishing their literary productions for twenty-one
years.”160 The preamble of that artist-centric statute reads:
Whereas, the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization,
the public weal of the community, and the advancement of human
happiness greatly depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons,
in the various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement such
persons can have, to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature,
must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry, to
themselves; and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men,
there being no property more peculiarly a man’s own, than that which is
produced by the labour of his mind: therefore, to encourage learned and
ingenious persons to write useful books, for the benefit of mankind, be it
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

8 Ann. 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally 1783 Mass. Acts 369.
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enacted.161

The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution (“IP
Clause”)162 followed from this in 1787, granting Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”163 It is widely accepted that the plain language
of the IP Clause indicates that the framers intended Congress to extend
protection to creators as a means to an end: “the promotion of science and
the useful arts.”164 At the core of copyright protection is creative
expression.165 Hence, while a work, itself, may appear to be at the heart of
such protection, the language of the Constitution suggests, instead, that the
creator of that work (or the rights holder, if the ownership structure is
varied by way of an assignment) and the general public are the more
appropriate focal point.166
From these early statutes, we can elicit quite a bit about what but maybe
even more critically, who the framers intended to protect. This focus is
somewhat intuitive given the subsequent drafting of the Copyright Act of
1909,167 which established a bundle of rights that vest in the creators of
original works of art for a limited duration.168 It thereby protects the owner
against “those who copy or otherwise take and use the form in which the
original work was expressed” by the author,169 and ensures that the work
will eventually reside in the public domain.
In enacting the Copyright Act of 1909 and the subsequent Copyright Act
of 1976,170 Congress held that giving artists exclusive rights over their
161. Id.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
163. Id.; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (interpreting the

term “writings” to include “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual
or aesthetic labor”).
164. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
165. See Edward L. Carter, Harmonization of Copyright Law in Response to
Technological Change: Lessons from Europe About Fair Use and Free Expression, 30
U. LA VERNE L. REV. 312, 315 (2009).
166. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
167. The Copyright Act of 1909 was derived from Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution, with influences from Britain’s Statute of Anne, and the earliest copyright
legislation in the U.S., the Copyright Act of 1790. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 et
seq. (2012).
168. See id. § 106 (providing copyright holders with the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform, display, or prepare derivative works of their copyrighted
work).
169. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 2, 6,
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_909_2016.pdf (last visited July 7,
2017).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing protection for “original works of author-
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creations “is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in
that it will stimulate writing and invention, to give some bonus to authors
and inventors.”171 Courts have construed this to include two key goals: (1)
to “allow the public access to the products of [the artist’s] genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired,”172 and (2) to reward the
owner.173
From these dual objectives arises the need to balance the “interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free
flow of ideas, information, and commerce.”174 In an effort to protect
tangible “writings and discoveries,” existing and proposed legislation fail
to fully encompass the entirety of the legislative intent set forth within the
Statute of Anne and subsequent copyright protections. With this language
in mind, what we should strive to protect in terms of fashion designs is
two–fold: primarily, we should protect specific, original elements that are
part of a garment or accessory, and we should also protect the reputation of
a brand in connection therewith.
Instead of protecting the underlying design of a simple dress or pair of
trousers, it is the additions, alterations, and/or modifications thereto that we
are seeking to protect. These value-added elements are the ones that fast
fashion copyists identify and ultimately, bank on. Such elements may take
the form of an ornate neckline of a dress that ASOS “borrows” from
Cushnie et Ochs or a skirt that Nasty Gal copies from Altuzarra.175 It is an
additional element of an otherwise commonplace dress design that is
distinctly Cushnie et Ochs’ in nature and one to which Cushnie et Ochs’
fans and other consumers, alike, are drawn and identify as Cushnie et
Ochs.176
In addition to protection that extends to the concrete, tangible aspects of
a design (the value-added elements that attract consumers to a given
garment or accessory), lawmakers need to endeavor to shield the
reputations of individual designers and/or design brands from harm.
Efforts to protect the “interests of authors and inventors” in connection
with the broader, more esoteric elements at play should also be embodied
in any proposed legislation. This is a truly critical element that has been
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
171. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 60–2222, at 7 (1909)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra Figures 1 & 3.
176. See supra Figure 1.
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uniformly excluded from or perhaps, more accurately, not considered in,
discussions of proposed protections for fashion designs to date.
Practically speaking, lawmakers should strive to safeguard a brand’s
intangible assets, namely, a designer’s brand image (and corresponding
brand signatures). These intangible assets are the foundations of luxury
and high fashion businesses. In the upper echelon of the fashion industry,
reputation is largely built upon a brand’s ability to be a purveyor of
garments and/or accessories that are simultaneously: (1) original and
appealing in terms of design; (2) oftentimes limited in quantity (i.e., not as
mass produced as fast fashion); (3) existing in a certain price category (i.e.,
expensive); and (4) demonstrative of a certain caliber in terms of quality.177
Designers are the foremost talents in the fashion industry, each bringing
distinct abilities and insights to their collections.178 They are the artists,
and the resulting garments and accessories are their creative expressions.179
It is based in large part on these individuals’ skills and unique vantage
points that discerning consumers are drawn to and purchase certain
garments and accessories.180
Jack McCollough and Lazaro Hernandez, for instance, the design duo
behind New York–based brand, Proenza Schouler, have been hailed for the
“craftsmanship, attention to detail, and relaxed yet refined style”181 of their
garments and accessories. Their collections “draw inspiration from
contemporary art and youth culture and feature fine tailoring and customdeveloped fabrics.”182 The designers learned these techniques through
years of education and training. McCollough spoke of his formal design
education, saying, at design school, “they teach you how to put together a
collection, draw, drape, and do everything on a technical level.”183 The
177. See INFO. RES. MGMT. ASS’N, ADVERTISING AND BRANDING: CONCEPTS,
METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS ch. 41 (2017) (speaking to consumers’
penchant for high fashion due to the level of quality associated with the garments and
accessories).
178. Imran Amed, Why Creative Directors Matter More Than Ever, BUS. OF
FASHION (June 12, 2013), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/right-brain-leftbrain/why -creative-directors-matter-more-than-ever.
179. Zandra Rhodes & Alice Rawsthorn, Is Fashion a True Art Form?, GUARDIAN
(July 13, 2003, 10:31 AM), https://www. theguardian.com/artanddesign/2003/jul/13/
art.artsfeatures1 (presenting both sides of the argument about whether fashion is an art
form).
180. Id.
181. Brands, ENTREPRENEURA, https://luciaallende.wordpress.com/categoryfashionnews/ (last visited July 15, 2017).
182. Id.
183. Kelsey Garcia, Proenza Schouler Goes Back to School for the Parsons 2013
Fashion Benefit, ELLE (May 23, 2013), http://www.elle.com/news/fashion-style/pars
ons-fashion-benefit-proenza-schouler.
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degree of skill and specificity that the Proenza Schouler duo possesses
results in their attention to “the tiniest of details—button sizes, the length of
an inseam, fabric finishes.”184
As discussed above, when a fast fashion retailer copies the design
signature and/or specific garments of another brand, the harm is profound;
and it is by no means limited to immediate sales. The potential harm
extends to the dilution of the brand image and its esteemed position in the
hierarchy of the fashion system.185 This reputation–based consumer
perception of a brand and the design talent that sustains the brand are its
greatest assets, even if they are intangible ones.
In this way, the appeal of high fashion and/or luxury brands is also based
on the image that a brand creates for itself. Brands are built upon
dedication to quality and original design, in addition to the use of large–
scale, meticulously crafted media and advertising initiatives.186 Fast
fashion retailers select garments and accessories to duplicate and offer for
sale based on these unique design elements, as well as the popularity of a
brand, in order to attract consumers. This is particularly true given that
such retailers tend to boast about their ability to provide “the look for less,”
which takes the form of copies of well–known and in–demand runway and
red carpet looks for a fraction of the price.187
Zara, a well-known purveyor of fast fashion garments and accessories,
for instance, does not sell a blatant copy of an Altuzarra dress because it is
inherently utilitarian; the retailer selects such a dress because of its creative
elements, those that are additional to the useful nature of the dress and that
can be traced back to Altuzarra. As a result, Zara is banking on the
designer’s expression of talent, insight and creativity, the exact things we
aim to protect with copyright law, as well as on the esteem and widespread
popularity of the brand, one that is popular amongst fashion editors and
184. David Amsden, Gen W: Proenza Schouler, W (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:00 AM), http:
//www.wmagazine.com/fashion/2012/10/proenza-schouler-10th-anniversary-andflagship-opening/.
185. Id.
186. Jayson DeMers, The Top 7 Characteristics of Successful Brands, FORBES (Nov.
12, 2013, 1:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysondemers/2013/11/12/the-top-7characteristics-of-successful-brands/2/#2dd90dbb61be; see also JEAN – NOEL KAP
FERER & VICENT BASTIEN, THE LUXURY STRATEGY: BREAK THE RULES OF MARKETING
TO BUILD LUXURY BRANDS (2d ed. 2012) (explaining that the “Luxury Strategy”
model aims to create the highest pricing power by leveraging all of a brand’s intangible
elements, including time, heritage, craftsmanship, handmade products, small series
ranges, and prestigious clients, exclusivity, and aspirationality).
187. See The Budget Babe, The Look for Less: Givenchy Fur Slide Sandals, BUDGET
BABE (May 1, 2017, 8:01 AM), http://www.thebudgetbabe.com/categories/10-TheLook-for-Less (providing an example of how to get a famous fashion trend on a
budget).
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Hollywood celebrities, alike.
With the critical role that brand image plays in the minds of consumers –
at least some of which purchase luxury fashion items because they wish to
be associated with a particular brand and the image it presents to society –
and considering that copyright law does not provide adequate protection of
garments and accessories, it may be more prudent to look beyond the scope
of copyright law for sources of protection.
V. DOES THE SOLUTION EXIST IN ANOTHER AREA OF LAW?
Having identified exactly what it is that should be protected –– the
original elements of a garment or accessory (i.e., the value–added
elements), as well as the reputation of designers and design brands (which
are developed in commerce in much the same way a reputation is bred) ––
it is clear that intellectual property laws in the United States do not provide
appropriate protection. Having said that, lawmakers do not need to
eradicate the existing intellectual property doctrines in order to achieve
such protection. Because copyright law is rooted in the IP Clause of the
Constitution and because that language supports a focus on who as opposed
to merely what we aim to protect, there is a strong parallel between the
situation at hand and the tort of defamation. Thus, there may be a way to
supplement existing copyright statutory and common laws to embody a
sufficient level of protection.
It is worth noting that embodying a defamation–style analysis within the
bounds of the existing copyright law, as is permitted by the IP Clause, is
logical, especially given the connection between an individual or
company’s reputation in the marketplace, and the reputation of a designer
or brand, as developed via his signature designs and quality of goods.
Employing such a construct would enable us to not only protect the original
value–added elements of a garment or accessory, but it would also take into
account the need to provide protection for a brand’s image in connection
with such copying. Furthermore, such an approach permits lawmakers to
largely remove the hurdles that prevent the adequate protection of fashion
designs, namely, the copyright doctrines of utility and separability. From
this perspective, it would not be outlandish to liken the case at hand –– one
in which a fast fashion retailer replicates a design’s most salient features
for a fraction of the cost and at a substantially lessened quality, while
specifically trading on the esteem and appeal of such a brand –– to one of
slander or libel.
In accordance with the theory of defamation –– which serves as an all–
encompassing term that covers any statement that hurts an individual’s
reputation –– individuals and entities have a right to not have false
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statements made that will damage their reputation.188 This body of tort law
provides redress for “injuries affecting a man’s reputation or good
name.”189 As such, reputation is held to be intangible property that is
protectable by law.190 Reputation is fostered in an individual’s field as a
result of efforts and labor, through “the exertion of talent in the learned
professions [and] the emoluments acquired by mechanical skill and
ingenuity.”191
Furthermore, reputation is “understood to be a form of ‘capital’ since it
‘creates funds’ and the potential for ‘patronage and support.’”192 It plays a
central role in the creation and maintenance of a thriving business, and
despite its status as an intangible asset, it is a measure of reputation, and/or
harm thereto. The various elements of reputation –– which include, but are
not limited to, “quality, value, and variety of goods”193 –– “connect
themselves with credit and character, affixing to them a value, not merely
ideal, but capable of pecuniary measurement, and consequently
recommending them as the proper objects of legal protection.”194
Consequently, the loss resulting from harm to reputation may be gauged in
a manner similar to that of the value of tangible property loss.
With the foregoing in mind, defamation is an apt comparison here for
several reasons, but primarily because of what it aims to protect and shield
against: reputation and the diminishment thereof or other harm thereto.
This is relevant in the context of design piracy, as fast fashion retailers are
primarily and very intentionally looking to designers’ individual creations
and their larger brand signatures, as well as the name and renown
associated with their brands as a whole. A retailer is not merely copying an
unknown garment originating from an unfamiliar brand. Fast fashion
188. 28 U.S.C. § 4104(1) (2012).
189. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and

the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1986).
190. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555,
592 (1997) (explaining that the necessity of protecting “reputation as a property
interest” is a longstanding principle, dating back to English common law); see also
Post, supra note 189, at 693 (describing how reputation as a property interest was
“subsequently incorporated into domestic law by the American colonial governments
via the common law of slander and libel, which is designed to effectuate society’s
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
191. THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM
MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMORS xxvi, xxvi (1832).
192. Id. at 694.
193. Isabelle Lundmark, Joanna Mainaud & Katarina Sjögren, The Link Between
Consumer Perception and Satisfaction: A Comparative Study of Shopping Malls and
City Centres, LINNAEUS U. (May 30, 2014), https://www.diva-portal.org/ smash/get/
diva2:721747/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
194. Post, supra note 189, at 693.
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piracy commonly targets well–known, sought–after garments in order to
benefit from the proven appeal of the garments, and to benefit from the
already–established esteem of the brand being targeted.195
The copying of a brand’s design by a fast fashion retailer proves
detrimental both in terms of the loss of sales but also in terms of damage
that results from the saturation (or the appearance of saturation) of the
market with inferior–quality copies of a designer’s original creations. By
manufacturing garments and accessories that closely resemble those of
another, often much more respected and high quality brand, fast fashion
retailers are able to profit from the work and the reputation of that other
brand, thereby harming the original designer and diluting the reputation he
has built for himself in the luxury fashion sector.
Thus, at issue for us is how to properly balance the protection of a
designer or brand’s reputation with the protections afforded by the First
Amendment, which provides for somewhat expansive freedoms of
expression. If we consider the guidance courts have offered in the context
of defamation, the answer that courts have given is intent: i.e. the “knowing
or reckless disregard of the truth” standard.196
Part II of this series will provide a detailed proposal for such a
defamation–style copyright analysis.
CONCLUSION
To date, the attempts to shield original fashion design from design piracy
by way of sui generis copyright law protection have fallen short.
Specifically, such proposed legislation fails to explicitly consider what and
who we aim to protect in the realm of fashion design. As a result, existing
approaches to the protection of fashion designs fail to grapple with the
problem presented when the invaluable asset of reputation of a designer or
design brand –– and the necessary element of exclusivity and quality
connected therewith –– is diminished or tarnished by way of widespread
fast fashion–induced piracy.
The existence of the doctrine of defamation provides meaningful support
for protection that can be applied to shield value–added elements inherent
in original fashion designs from harm without subjecting such works to the
copyright theories that make protection difficult to achieve. This
alternative provides an opportunity to rethink the aforementioned
195. See LOÉIL, https://theloeil.com/ (last visited May 26, 2017), (showing an
example of a website that is notorious for offering high fashion knockoffs. Such a
business model allows this company to not only benefit from the sale of affordable
copies of designer brand goods, but also from the established reputation and established
appeal of those brands).
196. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
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approaches to protecting fashion designs exactly where they are deficient.

